The Russians do not have enough strength to make their tactics successful/APU
Operational art as the ability to use groupings to encircle/destroy significant enemy forces in a space that stretches along the front and hundreds of kilometers in depth is a relatively new phenomenon born at the junction of two phenomena – nationalism and the industrial revolution.
< h3>Realities
These phenomena gave operational art the key – a mass of armed people, and as a result, one pitched battle stretched into an operation with the appropriate width and depth of the front.
And how well the current great war shows Ukraine and Muscovy – it is the mass that is the basis of operational art.
No improvements in the performance characteristics of weapons and military equipment (rate of fire, accuracy and range) compensate for the mass itself. That is, it turned out that it is not only quality that weighs, but also quantity. And after a certain decrease in the number in proportion to the tasks in the theater of operations (theater of war – ed.), no quality compensates for the lack of mass to perform the classic tasks of the operational level of war to encircle/destroy significant enemy forces, or at least such deep strikes as to threaten the main lines of communication and to force the enemy to roll back tens and hundreds of kilometers.
The Iraqi example
About the mass in operational art on the example of one of the last major operations. The international coalition to counter Iraq had almost 960 thousand “under arms”, of which almost 700 thousand were Americans.
< p>Operation Desert Storm/Pentagon
This was exactly enough to tie down the enemy (who was 650 thousand) and mislead the direction of a possible main strike, and then make a powerful flank coverage reinforced by the VII Corps of the Armed Forces United States, while guaranteeing the safety of this strike. And the geography of the theater of operations is not so great.
Conclusion
Hi, dolboyob*m from Muscovy, who swung at the whole of Ukraine with 200 thousand.
