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Who benefited the most from the change of power in Syria?

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Who benefited the most from the change of power in Syria?

Column author: Igor Tyshkevich

Turkey benefited the most from the change of power in Syria. Now Ankara’s task is to stabilize the situation inside the country and prevent large-scale clashes between various groups called the opposition. And, what is very important, to complete the operation against the Kurds, if possible, pushing the “western border” of Kurdistan 50-70 kilometers to the east.

This was reported by 24 Channel with reference to Igor Tyshkevich.

Turkish lessons and hidden prospects

From the other parties involved, the situation in Syria is as follows:

  • The USA – “stay with their own.” More precisely, not quite: no one is laying claim to their zone of control. But Turkey intends to significantly weaken the influence (in particular, the formation of a new government) of the Kurds. That is, to weaken the main pro-American force in the country.
  • Iran – was one of the most active participants in the process. And tried to participate (with the help of its proxies from Hezbollah) in the war until the very end. But at the same time, it conducted active negotiations with Turkey regarding the future of Syria. Suffice it to say that the head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry visited Ankara immediately after the fall of Aleppo.
  • Arabian monarchies. Paradoxically, they will strengthen their positions somewhat. The opposition groups associated with them in the south (and their allies from among their friends, the Christians) began the uprising “in time”, which caused the fall of Damascus. In the end, it was mainly these units that entered the capital, and not Hayat Tahrir al-Sham or the Syrian Turkomans.
  • Russia is losing influence, but retains a chance to even remain in Syria. True, on new terms in the format of one of the “second-order” forces.

Thus, the contours of the new government will be largely determined by Ankara with the influence of the Arabian monarchies and, possibly, Iran. Why not Russia? Because, unlike the listed external forces, it has made only one bet, working with Assad's entourage. Which, by the way, is strange, given its attempts to work with several groups simultaneously in “problematic” African countries.

What does gas have to do with it?

The media is already discussing the future of Russian military bases in Syria. Yes, their evacuation will complicate operations in Africa. But it will make such operations impossible. But if Turkey does create a stable government and it holds out for at least a year, the consequences could be extremely interesting.

We are not talking about military force, but, conditionally, in metal structures. More precisely, in pipelines.

The first project, the Arab Gas Pipeline, was conceived as a gas pipeline connecting Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and even Israel. The first stage was completed in 2003. But the construction of the Homs-Turkey branch never began. Therefore, control over Homs is extremely important for Turkey – after all, you can start “pulling a pipe” through territory that can even be patrolled by your troops.

The second project never began due to Assad's intransigence. We are talking about the Qatar-Turkey pipeline, which in the first project was supposed to pass through Syria. But the Syrian government wanted to play with other partners and bet on the Iran-Iraq-Syria pipeline, which was also never built. An alternative route for the Qatar-Turkey pipeline. But in this case it would pass through territory controlled by the Iraqi Kurds. That is, it would provide an additional economic (and political) base for the Kurdish forces. Which is unacceptable for Ankara.

Now let's get back to the projects. If a civil war between opposition groups does not start in Damascus (the war against the Kurds “does not count” – the pro-Turkish forces will continue it to one degree or another), then there is a possibility of reviving both projects. The Arab Gas Pipeline will go first.

And then, the construction of the “pipeline” from Qatar to Turkey may also start. The main thing here is the political decision of the “new government”, the determination of the route with the allocation of land (it is important here that it is the “new, democratic” state that enters into possible conflicts with the local population) and the consent of the presence of foreign PMCs or army units to protect the facility.

That is, from the start of the implementation of the pipeline from Qatar, a year of stability of the new government is needed, which will ensure the necessary decisions. Then we can work.

The most interesting thing is that the EU countries will be interested in implementing such projects (the gas will go to them). The US and Iran (if it does not participate in the projects) may become the enemy. But it is possible to come to an agreement with Washington, given the ever-growing role of Turkey in the region.

< p > But for Russia this is bad, much more painful than the possible evacuation of military bases. Because:

< li > Linear – Russia is losing the European gas market. And the reason here is not sanctions. It's just that Qatari gas (like Egyptian) delivered by the pipeline system will be cheaper than Russian gas. There, the cost of production is banal.

< li > Non-linear or political – region. Turkey is already becoming a regional superpower. And its strengthening in the energy sector will have unpleasant consequences for Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia. At the same time, a separate warning for dreamers: Turkey will not go “to a holy war against Russia”. Erdogan has already shown twice (the first time with Karabakh) what politics is: you keep silent about your plans, even work with Russia, and then, at the right moment, you act quickly.

  • Non-linear geopolitical. Here we are already talking about the weakening of Russia's positions in the Arab world. It will not disappear as a partner (projects in Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan continue), but it will lose some “weight” as a partner.
  • And Turkey has not even declared, but simply confirmed the fact of the emergence of a new regional superpower. And we will have to take this into account.

    The column is the personal opinion of the author, the editors of Channel 24 may not share it.

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