There's a bigger concern: how much does Russia's nuclear blackmail affect the West?

There is more concern: to what extent does Russia's nuclear blackmail affect the West? Anzhelika Galesevich

According to the new nuclear doctrine, Russia can strike even a non-nuclear power if it starts “aggression against Moscow” with the support of a nuclear one. The previous version also “allowed” to strike with nuclear weapons. Since Ukraine damaged early warning stations and also entered the territory of the Kursk region.

It should be noted that Russia changed the nuclear doctrine not in order to strike a nuclear strike. In this way, the aggressor country seeks to scare Western countries. Ivan Us, the chief consultant of the National Institute for Strategic Studies, explained in a conversation with Channel 24 how Russia's nuclear blackmail influences the West.

What scares the West more than the possibility of using nuclear weapons

Us noted that Russia decided to change its nuclear doctrine after the unsuccessful test of the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile at the Plesetsk cosmodrome. It is quite possible that the same situation could happen during an attempt to launch a nuclear strike. The weapon could fly only 35 kilometers, as happened during the only successful test of the Sarmat missile, and simply explode.

Seeing such failure and at the same time attempts to change the nuclear rhetoric, the West understands, “maybe these threats are from the world of theory, which are not based on the world of practice?!” Russian scare mongering is increasingly becoming a profanation. Ivan Us quoted the expression: “If you repeat a threat several times, it devalues ​​itself, loses its value.”

Given this, several questions arise.

1. Does Russia even have nuclear weapons? ?
2. Does Russia realize that a retaliatory strike would cause it devastating damage? ?
3. Does Russia understand that the Russian elite in London, which Putin often threatens to hit with a nuclear weapon, can interfere with Putin's plans? ?

Russian Nuclear threats are no longer as influential as concerns about the lack of a clear understanding of what the world will be like without Russia, noted Ivan Us, chief consultant at the National Institute for Strategic Studies.

In August 1991, the 41st US President George Bush Sr. spoke in the Verkhovna Rada. He said that Ukraine was not leaving the USSR. However, a few days later, the socialist state collapsed. Washington did not understand what the world would look like without the Soviet Union. As we can see, nothing terrible happened. Now there are such concerns about Kyiv.

The West is afraid of a world without Moscow. That is, if Ukraine wins, Russia will lose; if Russia loses, it may fall apart; if Russia falls apart, new realities will emerge. But Western countries are not ready for this yet.