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The coming weeks and months will see some of the toughest battles in the Russian-Ukrainian war. Neither Ukraine nor Russia wants a long war, but are also far from peace talks.
Lawrence Friedman, Emeritus Professor of Military Studies at King's College London, analyzed the situation in Ukraine and published his column on Comment is Freed.Channel 24 adapted Fridman's article for Ukrainian readers.
Ukraine and Russia are preparing offensives: what the difference between the parties to the conflict
As the professor writes, neither side of the conflict gives a hint of war weariness.
“They both seem ready to hold out for this year and next. Both show no enthusiasm for negotiating to reach a compromise solution. Even those who insist most on diplomatic compromises are stymied when asked to come up with a formula that has a fair chance be accepted by both sides. There is no obvious compromise. Ukraine wants its occupied territory back; Russia wants more,” says Lawrence Friedman.
Despite claims of a stalemate with the front line moving several kilometers, both sides are preparing an offensive to see if they can achieve a military breakthrough.
However, two sets forces and their associated operational concepts look different. Russian forces rely more and more on numerical strength, while Ukrainian forces rely on the quality of advanced Western systems, the professor notes.
Precedents of the Great War
Columnist Lawrence Friedman warned against predicting the course of the war, because both sides still have to make a strategic choice. He emphasized that during its last phase the war had taken on the appearance of a long struggle of attrition. the current level of intensity to infinity, writes the professor.
He noted that the scenes of battles in Ukraine with the bodies of dead soldiers a few meters from the trenches are reminiscent of the Western Front during the First World War.
“We can remember that there was a large Russian army on the Eastern Front from 1914 to 1917 , full of ill-equipped conscripts, let down by a chaotic command structure and inadequate logistics,” writes the military researcher.
On the Western Front, he noted, trench warfare eventually gave way to large-scale offensives.
After the Bolshevik Revolution, Russia made a separate and unprofitable peace, perhaps another precedent Putin wants to forget. As a result, Germany was able to increase its presence in the West to quickly move against the tired and exhausted French and British, seeking to win before the American contribution was fully tangible,” the column reads.
Lawrence Friedman recalled that the German spring offensive in March 1918 began with a massive artillery bombardment that quickly broke through the Allied lines. supplies, unable to keep up with the advancing troops. By the summer, the Allies slowed down their advance and began to push the exhausted German forces to the defensive. Soon the German army was faced with a retreat and mass surrender of its troops, writes a military researcher.
The scale of the German offensive overshadows what is happening in Ukraine
The professor notes that the scale of the German offensive during World War I overshadows everything that is now planned in the war between Russia and Ukraine. In particular, the German attack began with 10,000 guns firing over a million shells in a matter of hours, and by the time it ended, the British had lost 178,000 men, the French 77,000 and the Germans 240,000.
< p>When the British launched their own resistance in August 1918, they threw 13 divisions into the attack, supported by 2000 guns, 450 tanks and 1900 aircraft (this was one of the first examples of modern combined arms warfare).
Despite differences in scale, these battles demonstrated important offensive features: why their timing can be more influenced by the prospect of worse conditions in the future than good conditions now; the extent to which they test the morale, motivation, and cohesion of an army when it is rejected; how a failed offensive can leave an army defenseless against counterattacks,” writes Friedman.
The military researcher noted that Russia’s offensive at the beginning of the war, especially in the South, progressed rapidly, as did Ukraine last fall, when it faced a weak and poorly prepared defense of the invaders in the Kharkiv region.
In other places, the advance, as Fridman notes, was characterized by heavy losses and slow advance.
If this pattern repeats, then the prospect is almost the same and neither side will be able to win. he emphasizes.
Successful offensives change everything
Professor of military studies points out that a successful offensive by either side changes everything.
“The losing side is left with a tougher choice about its military options and whether it needs to consider a diplomatic solution,” the researcher writes.
Ukraine needs to wait
Ukraine is optimistic about the potential of the future offensive, because for the first time in this war it will be properly prepared. The West understands that Putin will not agree to any settlement that smells of defeat, the only alternative is to help Ukraine win some battles – at best, force Russia to leave the occupied territory; at least shock the Kremlin into admitting that its position is unacceptable.
While the main battle tanks received the most attention in the discussions before and after the Rammstein meeting, other elements of the package are just as important, if not more so than more infantry fighting vehicles, an improved air defense system, including the Patriot, and more artillery.
Ukraine is waiting for Western weapons
Friedman notes that all military assistance is extremely important for Ukraine. In particular, artillery to weaken Russian positions and interrupt their supply lines, maneuver forces to encircle their positions and exploit any gaps, and air defenses to protect the moving forces from Russian aircraft.
“Last year, about a sixth of Ukrainian weapons came from outside suppliers. External contributions are doubling. The total amount declared at Ramstein is at least one division of the NATO kit. The systems supplied are among the best available, which allows Ukraine to form three Ukrainian corps (or the equivalent of just three NATO divisions) and potentially at least one division suitable for serious offensive operations,” the professor writes.
However, he draws attention to the fact that the commitment of NATO countries to the victory of Ukraine has its own limits set by the nuclear escalation alarm.
These countries do not send their forces to fight and do not want to be associated with Ukrainian strikes deep into Russian territory. Therefore, they are holding back the provision of aircraft,” notes he.
It takes a certain amount of time before the promised weapon affects the course of the war, because it needs time to reach Ukraine and integrate into its forces. Some valuable systems are on the way – the first batch of US Bradley IFVs and French AMX-10 combat reconnaissance vehicles are already arriving.
“But there are logistical problems – transporting these heavy systems and all the kit that comes with them, including ammunition, is a serious task. In some cases, as in the case of small diameter bombs that can be launched using HIMARS launchers, production has not yet begun “, – says the professor's column.
He noted that these bombs will allow the Ukrainians to hit targets at a distance of 140 km, which will create additional problems for Russian logistics.
Until they arrive, the UK is considering sending “longer-range capabilities”, in particular Stormshadow air-to-ground cruise missiles, to “detonate Russia's ability to sustainably strike Ukraine's civilian and critical national infrastructure.”
< p> Delivery of the first of the promised tanks to Ukraine will not take much time. But they need potentially lengthy training programs to make sure the tanks are used properly.
Ukrainians are highly motivated and learn quickly, so they tend to do in a week what would normally take months. Ukraine was waiting for Western governments to understand the logic of the military situation and their political obligations.
In the current battles, the Ukrainians tend to be inferior in armaments, cope with old and often worn-out equipment, and suffer losses, even if they inflict much more on Russian forces.
The need to make the most of their new capabilities requires delaying action until their offensive units are fully equipped and ready for action. However, this means that the initiative remains with the enemy, and Russian forces are now concentrating for new attacks, Friedman emphasizes.
Russia is in a hurry: how the Kremlin is preparing for a long war
Russia is in a state of martial law, mobilization systems are functioning and do not suffer from the organizational chaos of the first weeks. They can make up for lost manpower, and they do it all the time, even if they don't have well-trained and motivated troops.
Defense production has been increased to accommodate new supplies of equipment and munitions, even if that doesn't quite make up for what was lost. They are preparing for a long war.
Putin does not know how to end this war without exposing its cost and futility, although he has no obvious path to victory. Part of his long-term military strategy was based on the hope that Russia's enemies would tire first. Attacks on Ukraine's critical infrastructure, which required a large number of available missiles and drones, could have been punitive and retaliatory, but they also had strategic intent, Friedman notes.
Making life difficult for the population of Ukraine in the winter , Putin hoped to force Kiev to admit defeat.
“The attacks certainly managed to make life miserable, but they failed as a form of political pressure. Likewise, the impact of the energy crisis caused by oil and gas supply disruptions is now waning, again failing to quell Western governments’ willingness to support Ukraine. (That’s more one reason why the January statements of Ukraine's supporters were important – not only because of the peculiarities of its new capabilities, but also as a confirmation of their commitment to the cause of Ukraine), the professor writes.
Putin is no longer so sure that he can win endurance test.
Military researcher notes that Russia successfully coped with Western sanctions in the first year and the demands of the war. However, now Russia is beginning to experience an economic blow.
Last month, oil and gas revenues were almost halved from last year, and oil is now trading at $49.48 a barrel. The rest of the income decreased by about 28%, while expenses rose by almost 60%. Putin may still feel that he can win the endurance test, but he can no longer be so sure, the professor notes.
The Kremlin dictator is also dissatisfied with the current state of the land war, because he has not achieved his minimum goal of control over the Donbass. Putin also wants Kherson and Zaporozhye permanently recognized as part of Russia.
“In any case, he needs his forces to thwart alleged Ukrainian offensives and continue Russia's offensive,” Fridman's op-ed reads.
The professor believes that the absence of offensive efforts is the best explanation for the appointment of Valery Gerasimov as the head of the occupation forces.
While the move was likely linked to a struggle for influence in the Kremlin, the main reason seems to have been Putin's frustration with the lack of an offensive effort. to which Putin reluctantly agreed due to the symbolism of leaving the city, which had just been declared part of Russia. Now he has enough defense,” writes Fridman.
Battle tactics
There are reports that 320,000 Russian military, many recently mobilized, are now in Ukraine, and that weapons have been removed from storage for use.
Ukrainian intelligence claims that the movement of assault groups to the east reflects Putin's order “to seize the territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions until March.” On the Russian side, there is a warning from Defense Minister Shoigu that Western arms supplies to Ukraine could eventually lead to an “unpredictable escalation”.
The only reason Putin and Gerasimov can be sure that the new offensive operations will be more successful than last year is that they now have a large number of troops, points out a professor from Britain
Since April, the Russian offensives have consisted of long, expensive, relentless battles to take villages, towns and cities, which by the time they were taken were reduced to ruins by artillery shelling and from which the population fled. The battle to take Severodonetsk in the summer left their ground forces so exhausted that they could only remain in the game thanks to the mass mobilization announced at the end of September.
Additional troops showed their value in defense. Together with the weather, they made it difficult for the Ukrainians to advance. However, there is no evidence that they facilitated the Russian offensive. Although Russia may have gained an advantage in the battles of Soledar and Bakhmut, which have been talked about as a key target since the summer, even this fight is not over yet.
In all these battles, the Ukrainians suffered terrible losses, but they served its goal.
How Russia uses manpower
Lawrence Friedman drew attention to a statement by RAND Corporation's Dara Masikot, pointing to a number of areas in which Russian troops have demonstrated the ability to learn and adapt.
In particular, the Russians have changed their logistics systems so that key assets remain out of HIMARS reach; development of the ability to jam Ukrainian communications without jamming one's own; the accuracy of attacks on the electric networks of Ukraine; air defense missiles repurposed to hit ground targets
The column states that the Russians have developed a tactic of using their soldiers as a cheap resource. Despite losses, the manpower helps reveal the location of the Ukrainian lines so that they can be better targeted by artillery, and also exhausts the defenders so that they are less able to cope with the professional and better equipped Russian units.
Lawrence Friedman asks how far this tactic could take Russia. And for this, he mentions the so-called “people's militia” in the Donbass, which is supported by Russia. From the very beginning, they used manpower as consumables, in particular in the battles for Severodonetsk.
As a result, the “people's militia” suffered catastrophic losses, which reduced the combat value of the infantry “below the plinth”. Due to appropriate tactics, only the teams of battalions, regiments and brigades and artillerymen remained alive.
Russia hides the truth from the mobilized
A researcher from Britain recalls that the stocks of former convicts in the Wagner PPK also began to run out. The reason is that rumors reached the prison that 20% of those who wanted to fight for their freedom survived. Consequently, the flow of new recruits from this source has decreased.
Despite the desire of the Vlanisk of the Wagner Air Force, Yevgeny Prigozhin, to become famous for having “taken” Bakhmut, the Wagnerites need the help of Russian regular troops.
Friedman states that all this calls into question, will be mobilized just as ready to play a key role in future offensives.
In addition, he noted that upon arrival at the front, the mobilized are kept separate from the veterans so that they do not learn too much about the conditions in which they will have to fight.
“There are some suggestions that Russian tactics may is already changing due to the difficulty of persuading the mobilized to play their miserable role,” the professor notes.
All indications are that the Russians are urgently moving forward to capture more territory in the coming weeks. Recently, however, they have not shown the ability to maneuver in large formations, but have moved slowly at great cost.
Even where they are mobile, they often have to navigate swampy terrain. Lawrence Friedman points out that it's still too early to attack.
The reasons offensive is associated with spring is because when the ground hardens and trees grow, it's easier to move quickly with some cover. The losses of Russian equipment have been huge, so in many cases they depend on old systems that suffer from wear and tear. The air force is sometimes active, but is held back by Ukrainian air defense, the professor points out.
He also noted problems with the cohesion of the Russian army. Indeed, in addition to the regular units of the army, there are “people's militias” of the so-called “DNR” and “LNR”, Kadyrovtsy and Cossacks, Wagnerites and other PMCs.
“They are facing Ukrainian forces that still appear to be highly motivated and capable, even as they wait for better equipment. Ukrainian intelligence is good, its communications network is functioning effectively, and they have shown how they can use drones and other forms of intelligence to identify concentrations of Russian troops and call for accurate artillery fire,” Fridman writes.
They are skeptical about the Russian offensive
That is why, as the military researcher writes, the future Russian offensive is skeptical. The British Ministry of Defense reported that the Russian leadership was demanding a “major advance” from its senior commands with the aim of occupying the entire Donetsk region, and that this involved developing “plans that require understaffed, inexperienced units to achieve unrealistic goals.”
While noting that Russian troops have so far “managed to conquer only a few hundred meters of territory per week”, mainly due to the lack of “ammunition and maneuver units necessary for a successful offensive”, the Ministry of Defense concluded that “it remains unlikely that Russia can increase forces “necessary to have a significant impact on the outcome of the war over the coming weeks.”
Other military analysts also suggest that the upcoming Russian offensives will be “unflattering”. Michael Kofman believes it is unlikely that Russia will make significant progress towards Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, where Ukrainian forces can meet them.
Most likely, the Russians will move in the direction of Kremennaya and further to Liman. They attacked Vuhledar in the south of Donetsk, and direct Russian attacks led to serious losses in manpower and equipment.
Russia wants to capture the Donbass in an unrealistic timeframe
The American Institute for the Study of War notes that ” The Russian military command may be in a hurry to launch a large-scale offensive operation with the aim of capturing the Donetsk region in an unrealistic time frame and, probably, without sufficient combat power.”
The Center for Defense Research notes that: “The enemy does not have enough infantry units to quickly advance deep into the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as “forces and means for the simultaneous conduct of more than two offensive operations.”
One of the reasons why the offensive last year did not go according to plan, was that the Russians tried to attack in many directions at the same time, but if all their efforts are concentrated in one or two directions, then the defense task of Ukraine is simplified.
Based on past performance, it's hard to see how they can manage fast and efficient moves to catch the Ukrainian defenders by surprise and break through their lines.
Ukraine should avoid getting drawn into the fighting: the time for the Ukrainian Armed Forces will come
“At the same time, the huge number of troops and Russia's readiness to suffer significant losses, even if it is wishful thinking in Moscow, means that the Ukrainians cannot help but perceive the future offensive with some anxiety, believing that this will not be a decisive and stalemate moment” .
The goal could be to launch a series of attacks that take a lot of time and soldiers to show Putin that they still have the initiative, or to occupy the Ukrainian forces, repelling a series of limited attacks to deprive them of the opportunity to prepare their own attacks.
Now the task of Ukraine is to repel these attacks without losing many positions. They still need to avoid interfering in combat until their new offensive builds are ready. Finally, their turn will come,” concludes Lawrence Friedman.
