Russian invaders stuck in Ukrainian defense – interview with military expert

Russian occupiers are stuck in the Ukrainian defense, – an interview with a military expert/Channel 24 website collage

The large-scale war launched by Russia against our country at the end of February has been going on for three months now. As of the end of May, the South and East of Ukraine remain the hottest destinations.

What is happening today on the battlefields of an open war, what will military micromanagement give Vladimir Putin, has Russia lost the chance to attract the CSTO troops to its side, and what is the situation with military assistance from Western partners? military expert Nikolai Beleskov.

The situation at the front

Nikolay, tell us what is happening on the battlefields now?

In principle, the front of the Ukrainian-Russian war is now divided into two segments that are essentially different in combat operations.

• A segment where the situation is not distinguished by active actions either by ours or by the Russians. First of all, it is Kherson region, Zaporozhye region. Since the balance of power is the same, and neither we nor the Russians can carry out offensive operations for lack of the necessary forces.

Here, the front line practically does not move anymore not the first day. Moreover, the enemy, unfortunately, is already beginning to fortify the positions he occupies and prepare to defend the corresponding lines. Here the enemy is bogged down in our defenses. Therefore, the battle is on attrition.

• And the second is, of course, an arc that stretches from Izyum to Liman along the Seversky Donets to Severodonetsk, Popasna, Avdiivka. And further south to Maryinka and Ugledar. This is a zone of active combat operations, where the enemy is trying to break through our defenses, this is not possible. He has been trampling on these lines for more than a month. And if it advances, then this advance is very slow due to heavy fighting, accompanied by heavy losses.

And we, accordingly, are conducting an active defense operation. And yes, we actually ended the battle for Kharkov in our favor. That is, we can say that we won in the Slobozhansky direction. Even those territories to the north and northeast of Kharkov can already be regarded as marginal phenomena.

As a result, military operations will not be very active in this segment either. At the same time, it should be noted that artillery duels are constantly taking place on both sectors of the front.

Nikolay Beleskov spoke about the situation at the front/Photo from the speaker's archive

Let's detail the situation in the East.

The Russians are moving very slowly there. 1 – 2 kilometers a week – this is by no means the pace of the offensive. An offensive operation is when, after a few days, the front line breaks through and forces for the development of a breakthrough are introduced, which after 3-4 weeks carry out the tasks of encircling and destroying the forces of the defenders of the broken front.

The big battle for Donbass has been going on for a month already, and advancing 1-2 kilometers or capturing Popasna after it was completely destroyed are definitely not indicators of success. The aggressors on this sector of the front have only isolated tactical successes that do not grow into something more. As I said, they are actually bogged down in our defense.

Such an effective defense on our part is a consequence of the great self-sacrifice of our soldiers. Unfortunately, the enemy effectively uses artillery and aircraft against us, which leads to an increase in the number of wounded and dead defenders. It is difficult for the medical system to cope with this due to the overload of front-line medical institutions. And yet, we have created a coherent front line. In contrast to the first period of the war, when the defense was of a focal nature.

Now the front line is intact. As a result, it is very, very difficult to break through because of the high saturation of anti-tank weapons and because of the active nature of the defense itself. We do not wait until the enemy outplays us in the concentration of forces in one direction or another.

Instead, we fight proactively, striking as often as our rocket troops and artillery allow us to do. As the example with the destruction of pontoons showed, we calculate the steps of the Russians ahead of time and prepare for them. In sum, this gives a powerful effect.

What can you say about the Kherson direction?

In the context of the fact that now our main forces are in the East, we cannot afford such a luxury as the concentration of superior forces in the Kherson region and begin to win it back. Plus, again, defending and attacking are two big differences in terms of both the number of forces and their quality. Therefore, for now, I would not talk about the counteroffensive.

Now we are solving a slightly different range of tasks. The main question is with what forces the Russians will end the battle in the East. We will continue to monitor the situation. Will they have enough strength to hold the front line in the same Kherson region.

Perhaps they will retreat beyond the Dnieper themselves in the Kherson region. They will do this to level the front line, so that the front line becomes shorter. They simply do not have enough strength to hold such a long front line. Especially with heavy losses during the battle for the East.

Well, the question of our potential. It is one thing to conduct defensive operations, where anti-armor weapons (NLAW and Stinger – Channel 24), which are constantly provided to us, come to the fore. And quite another is the conduct of offensive operations, during which the leading role is assigned to heavy weapons. So far, too little of the latter is being sent to us in order to conduct large-scale offensive operations.

The key now is to deplete the offensive potential of the enemy in the East, and then we will proceed from what the balance of forces will be.

The decision of the Kremlin and the state of the Russian army

About what is evidence of Putin's desire to command Russian troops himself?

This is a good indicator that the enemy is doing poorly. Under normal conditions, politicians should not interfere at the tactical level at all, and at the operational level they should only understand what is happening in general terms. But do not tell how to fight.

That is, they can combine it with some political goals, strategic tasks, but not interfere with the organization and conduct of operations. Just make sure that this combination of political and military goals is present. The use of micromanagement here will not lead to anything good. On the contrary, only to even greater sacrifices on the Russian side.

Consequently, and the failure of all possible designs. When politicians poke their nose into the affairs of the military, this is not good. The military themselves know how best to fight. Politicians should keep their finger on the pulse of frontline events and nothing more.

What kind of fuss has risen in the Western military-analytical environment, associated with the reassessment of the combat potential of the Russian army?

We should probably start with the fact that there are no analysts who have a perfect track record. Everyone can be wrong. The initial reassessment of Russian forces had fatal consequences for us in terms of providing sufficient military support. An error has occurred and has been acknowledged. Now the assessment is treated more carefully.

At present, the assessment of the prospects of the Russian army looks quite correct. Western analysts agreed that they had made a mistake and would now be more restrained in their assessments of our enemy's capabilities. On the other hand, we still see that discussions continue. Much wider this time, covering politicians.

Disputes continue regarding the level of assistance, the prospects for resolving the situation. Western partners continue to debate among themselves whether Russia is ready to escalate with the use of weapons of mass destruction. Now we have already passed the stage when it was necessary to reproach Western experts for their miscalculations. At present, their underestimation no longer plays any role.

Everyone has seen what Ukraine is capable of, and they have also seen how Russia really fights. Nevertheless, no one canceled risks like nuclear escalation, and this, unfortunately, continues to hold back our partners in the issue of arms supply, which is the most critical for us.

How might the results of the re-evaluation affect the updated power rating of the enemy army on a global scale?

All of the ratings compiled were formed on the basis of quantitative indicators. This was precisely the reason for the reassessment of the Russian army not only by the Western analytical community, but also by the intelligence community. A classic of the genre, as they say. They primarily focused on quantitative indicators while not taking into account qualitative ones.

At present, the situation is developing in such a way that without mobilization, without the transition of the economy to a military footing, that part of the Russian army that is capable of conducting ground combat operations will soon stop its existence. The maximum that can remain is part of the troops, which will go over to the defense of the already captured parts of our territory at the moment.

Has Putin finally lost the chance to win over the military potential of the CSTO?< /strong>