Publication author
Nikolai Beleskov
Factors influencing the development of events are divided into 2 categories – subjective and objective. Subjective ones are those where the quality of the efforts of the involved players can influence the result. Objectives are factors out of your control.
The consequences of the decision of the Russians saw under Ugledar
There are some objective factors that work against us. First of all, the question is why the quality of resistance would like to be better at the current moment.
The reason is that our regular army, which was as of February 24, 2022, and the reserve trained in the ATO / JFO suffered significant losses – killed, wounded, mentally and physically exhausted after a year of such a war.
It’s just that we used to talk about what losses the personnel army of Muscovy suffered after February 24, 2022, and as a result, a dilemma arose: either prepare reinforcements and distract those who can fight here and now, or not do this, but aggravate their long-term situation. The Muscovites chose the first, and saw the consequences near Ugledar, when the occupiers lost a lot of equipment used by those who were mobilized.
But the problem is that we have the same dilemma. It is also difficult to solve it – there are current requirements to fight here and now, but there are issues of training those who have recently been mobilized.
There is a solution
All this is superimposed on our losses of the most prepared, which are the result of the fact that we are forced to compensate for the lack of heavy weapons and ammunition with people.
Escalation management, which is the #1 issue for the Joe Biden administration, has involved protracted discussions and half-decisions over how and when to disarm since February 24 last year. The result is losses in the regular army and among the trained reserve. Then there is an even greater negative multiplier effect in the issue of ensuring the quality of resistance for the future.
These are all objective circumstances that are difficult for us to influence. As a result, we have what we have. But with what we have, we're doing well.
The only thing is that, unlike the Muscovites, we have a bunch of training programs from partners that allow us to teach the recently mobilized elements of modern combined arms combat and combined arms operations.
