Brief version of the news
- After his “victory” in the so-called elections in Russia, Vladimir Putin can rule until 2036. However, Yuri Felshtinsky believes that the head of the Kremlin is unlikely to live to see this time.
- In Russia there are 2 influential structures that rule the country. On the one hand, there is the presidential apparatus, led by Putin. On the other hand, there is the federal security service, which brought Putin to power.
- Felshtinsky is convinced that it is the FSB that rules Russia “from the shadows”, and Putin provides leadership of the country for the FSB.
Vladimir Putin “won” the presidential elections in Russia, and his inauguration is scheduled for May 7th. After this, the head of the Kremlin will be able to rule the country until 2036.
However, Doctor of Historical Sciences and writer Yuri Felshtinsky in in a conversation with Channel 24 he expressed doubts that the Russian dictator would survive until this time. More about this, who rules Russia “from the shadows” and what Putin is very afraid of – read further in the material.
How long does Putin have left
7 May Vladimir Putin will be inaugurated. This will be the fifth term of the Russian president. In your opinion, what is most striking now? How Putin has changed over these four terms and more than 20 years in power?
When an emperor has been in power for 25 years, he probably looks at himself with an increasingly serious and confident look.
You need to understand that so far only Joseph Stalin has ruled in the Soviet Union longer than Putin. Stalin led the state from 1923 to 1953 – exactly 30 years. Therefore, Putin has the opportunity to become, if nothing happens to him in the coming years, the longest-serving ruler of Russia.
I think that this is what he has been striving for for a long time, because if you remember, some time ago the Russian state was rigged at the legislative level to allow Putin to be president until 2036. As I wrote, then Putin created a very convenient, comfortable and stable system for himself. And he can remain president until 2036 with one exception – if he doesn't start a big war.
In 2022, he started a big war . I don’t think, of course, that it will last until 2036, let’s be honest. But at the same time, the war was restructured into a slightly different format from Russia’s point of view. That is, Russia has now introduced itself into a permanent war mode. And the way she leads her, she can lead her forever. Will the rest of the world look at this calmly and patiently, allowing this war to continue forever? This is a separate conversation.
Who really runs Russia
How the role of the intelligence services has changed during this time? And has it changed at all ? After all, back then there were terrorist attacks to attract Russians to the war in Chechnya, and now Russians are also being agitated to go to war, albeit against Ukraine.< /p>
Putin became president in 2000, and we must understand that he became president as a representative of the FSB, as a representative of state security. And he put him in charge of the FSB institute. However, when a person has been in charge for 20 years, he gradually stops looking at himself as a protege. Even if this protege is such a powerful and related structure as the FSB. He worked there all his life.
A parallel, let's say, management system is gradually strengthening, which can gradually become the main one – the presidential apparatus. Today in Russia there are two management systems, two structures. One is in charge – this is the presidential apparatus, headed by Putin, the former head of the FSB. And then there is the department of the FSB, which is run by a board that we know exists, and even Putin sometimes appears before it, which we are informed about. Not every speech by Putin is reported, but some are reported. That is, he did not participate in government. There is also a cabinet of ministers.
By the way, all ministers are probably nervously awaiting new appointments; they are waiting to understand whether they will remain in their posts or be removed. It is quite possible, as often happens when a president begins a new term, that some ministers leave their posts. I don’t think that Sergei Shoigu is in danger of resigning, which is what many are talking and discussing now.
The position of prime minister is very important. According to the Russian constitution, if something happens to the president, such as he dies or resigns, the prime minister becomes acting president. This is exactly how Putin came to power. He was first made prime minister, and then Boris Yeltsin resigned, and accordingly, Prime Minister Putin became acting president, and then was held through elections. Therefore, the position of prime minister is very important from this point of view.
In general, the cabinet of ministers, by tradition in Russia, as it was in the Soviet Union, has nothing to do with political decisions. This is a purely technical body that previously helped the Politburo and the General Secretary, and now helps the presidential administration and Putin technically manage the state.
About the conflict between Putin and the FSB
In your book “From the Red Terror to the Mafia State” you described a very interesting point – how Putin came to power. Allegedly, a list was placed on Yeltsin’s desk, where there were three candidates and one of them was Putin. Many years have passed, do you think who now reports to whom – FSB Putin or Putin FSB?
This is a difficult question, because, I emphasize, in 2000 Putin was “put on the table,” but over time he grew in his own eyes. Probably the most correct and wise thing that the FSB, for its part as an agency, and Putin, for its part as president, can do is not to enter into conflict. At least in open conflict with each other.
Although I think that the events of June 2024 – the so-called “Prigozhin’s path” – are precisely the reason for the confrontation between the FSB and the presidential administration. More precisely, perhaps, a confrontation between Nikolai Patrushev and the presidential administration. Patrushev, by tradition, is one of the curators of the FSB, although he is a former director of the FSB and now formally Alexander Bortnikov heads state security. However, Patrushev, of course, remains quite an important and influential leader there.
The so-called conflict between Prigozhin and Shoigu, I emphasize, was not a conflict between Prigozhin and Shoigu. This was really a conflict between the FSB as an agency and the presidential apparatus, or rather Putin as the person who heads the presidential apparatus. Because Putin tried, and perhaps even realized the idea of taking the Wagnerites away from the FSB. Now it’s difficult to understand this. PMC “Wagner” was a parallel structure that was created by the FSB and which belonged to the FSB. Putin saw this as a threat.
If you remember, some time ago Putin created the National Guard and put Viktor Zolotov at its head, a man loyal to him, the former head of his personal security. The Russian Guard was created as the personal guard of the president. These were troops called upon to protect the president, in addition to the federal security service that already existed. This is a very serious structure that protects the top officials of the state, in particular Putin.
Putin has been playing it safe all these years. In order to feel even more secure, he constantly created some additional protective measures for himself. The Russian Guard was apparently created precisely for this purpose. But the FSB, for its part, also created a serious additional parallel structure, namely PMCs and the so-called Wagnerites, headed at the administrative level by Prigozhin, who was an FSB agent. This sounds a little naive, but if you keep Prigozhin in mind, then he was a very serious FSB agent.
Putin felt that the PMC was increasing its power and influence. When they were transferred from foreign operations to Ukraine and already began to play a fairly serious role in military operations, Putin saw a threat in all this and gave instructions to transfer the PMCs to the subordination of the Ministry of Defense – the department of Shoigu, who is loyal to him, whom he completely trusts, because it is his protege .
Shoigu is unlikely to be dismissed because Putin trusts him/Getty Images
Thus, the conflict occurred due to the fact that the FSB categorically refused to transfer its military units to the Ministry of Defense. This conflict was presented to us as a conflict allegedly between Defense Minister Shoigu and some incomprehensible Yevgeny Prigozhin. In fact, it was a departmental conflict.
We don’t fully understand how it ended. That is, we see that in the FSB everyone remained in their posts, and Putin remained in his position, and Patrushev remained in his position. As they say, Prigozhin and Utkin suffered, but this is a bargaining chip. Their lives were never valuable either for Putin or for Patrushev, so they were brought to be torn to pieces (punished – Channel 24).
At the same time, PMCs somehow would exist. Some went over to Kadyrov’s men, some went to Belarus, some joined the army, and some remained as they are. Therefore, I think Putin ultimately won this battle. But not completely and not completely, because no one was punished. Except for Prigozhin, who didn’t bother anyone.
Did the “victory” in the elections change anything for Putin
The Associated Press wrote in March that after the election, Putin felt more confident than ever, amid the Kremlin's belief in Russia's military superiority in the war against Ukraine and a growing sense of Western weakness. Do you agree with this opinion?
He, of course, feels confident if he has in view of the internal situation in Russia. Because in 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, they brought on a silver platter a public opinion poll that 86% of Russian citizens support the annexation of Crimea. But we will never know what percentage of Russian citizens actually supported this. It may not even be very important.
It is important that the people who organized Putin's elections and had to think about what percentage to write for him could not give him a score lower than 86%. Because then everyone would have said, look, when Crimea was taken without a fight, 86% of the population was in favor, but now, when the war in Ukraine continues, for example, only 80%. Consequently, 6% are against, Putin lost 6%. relatively “plausible”. But it doesn’t look plausible at all, let’s be honest, for the following reasons:
- firstly, is very interesting Chechen figure . There, 97% of those who voted seemed to vote for Putin. That is, after two Chechen wars, and even after Ramzan Kadyrov, it is absolutely clear that these 97% could not have been there, no way;
- the same percentage was given for the Russian army to show that the army supports Putin.
< p>There is no such percentage as 97%, it cannot exist. These are drawn numbers. Drawn due to the following circumstances:
- the election computer is controlled according to FSB law in Russia;
- there is a law on remote voting, that is, a law that allows you to vote remotely.
This is generally a good law in normal times country, because why waste time and go to the polling station. However, not in Russia, especially when elections are extended by three days instead of one. In Russia, this allows you to enter into the computer the votes of people who did not come to the polling stations.
Therefore, no one will ever know how many people actually voted for Vladimir Putin. I don't think this is important for the Russian president, because there are no tools to replace him.
< em>Putin received more than 87% of the so-called elections/Getty Images
Any Western politician depends on voters , and Putin does not depend on them. There is no connection between the Russian leadership and the voter. There is no democracy there either, the press is controlled, so Putin feels confident.
Does he feel more confident than in February 2022? I don’t think so. The course of the war turned out to be unsuccessful and not at all what Putin imagined it to be. We do not see any serious positive changes in the war for Russia. Unfortunately, Ukraine cannot achieve any breakthrough either. Russia, of course, may be in a state of permanent war, into which Putin has driven it throughout his next presidential term. However, provided that circumstances and the world community, in particular the United States and Europe, allow it.
Now Russia seems to be investing people and money in this war, but there is no meaning or breakthrough. However, since Russia does not have any internal forces that can oppose Putin, it turns out that he, having trampled the entire political platform, rules the state unilaterally.
The FSB as an agency cannot give anything to the country except Putin. Let’s say that they remove Putin and install someone else, but if this other person still intends to continue the war, then nothing will change. The course of hostilities will definitely not change with the change of president. At the same time, I think that there are no forces in Russia who would like to stop the war and return to the positions of 1991.
What mistake did the Russian opposition make
It seems to me that among people who are involved in government at any level, there is hardly any opposition. We do not see defectors from the diplomatic corps abroad, high-profile resignations and the like. After all, many people could resign for health reasons without even making a declaration.
What we see is that all the people who are related to the state, they support Putin. This suggests that we do not need to wait for the emergence of opposition and count on the fact that Russia, through internal resources, will be able to return to consciousness and want to stop the war. I think that this will not happen.
What do you think about the opposition that now abroad? For example, the Anti-Corruption Foundation, other oppositionists, those who were colleagues of Boris Nemtsov, Alexei Navalny.
The Russian opposition is fragmented and contradictory. Unfortunately, this has always been the case. Different people actually have different views on the situation. And this is normal for Western pluralism. In general, it is difficult to imagine that people who emigrated will suddenly begin to march to the same tune and shout some slogans in unison.
They all have their own opinion. Therefore, as many opposition leaders as there are, there are as many views. The biggest problem for the Russian opposition is understanding what to do now because of this war. There are a variety of positions here.
I have one somewhat amusing qualifier for the Russian opposition. I believe that Russia should be led by a person who supports Ukraine in a football match between Ukraine and Russia. When such people appear in the Russian opposition, then the real Russian opposition will begin to build. So far this is mostly not the case.
Now almost everyone in the Russian opposition is against Putin and the war in Ukraine, but then disagreements appear. Talk about a kind and good Russia of the future is legitimate, but, in my opinion, with two amendments:
- this will be possible think only after Russia is defeated in the war;
- according to the experience of the Second World War, according to the experience of German history after 1945, in order for the possibility of a future Russia to arise, approximately 75 years, and if the war lasts even longer or escalates, then maybe a century. Now it is still very early to talk about a good Russia of the future.
I have always been categorically against the general slogan that the main problem of Russia is that it is led by thieves and corrupt officials. I thought that this slogan of Navalny was misleading everyone, because this is not the main problem. Unfortunately, this slogan literally disarmed all of Europe and the United States.
If Russia is ruled by thieves, then this is not a strategic threat to Europe and the USA, because it is always possible to negotiate with thieves. But with state security and Putin it’s impossible. The main feature of the Russian president is that he represents state security as a corporation that rules Russia and is going to dominate the whole world.
I have a feeling that two episodes of a documentary film by the so-called Anti-Corruption Foundation are a platform for uniting and integrating FBK into the Russian Communist Party, as well as an attempt, together with Gennady Zyuganov, to fight for votes in the next elections. When and if they take place. After all, the only positive hero of this two-part film is Zyuganov. The rest are presented to the viewer with a serious disadvantage.
Therefore, it seems to me that this is inappropriate election propaganda for the Communist Party from the point of view of time. Probably, it only makes sense if FBK plans to win over the votes of voters who support the Communist Party in Russia.
Unlike the rest political parties that Putin destroyed, the Communist Party is traditionally still alive and even receives percentages in the elections. By the way, the leader of the Communist Party Zyuganov also supported the war in Ukraine. Therefore, this is the only point in making this film.
Everyone already knows that privatization was carried out dishonestly, that they stole a lot and that Yeltsin drank. However, the question is that there were other tasks – to weaken the Soviet state as quickly as possible and take away everything that this state owned, so that this evil empire could never rise. All the same, as we see, it rose because they could not solve this problem completely.
Regarding robbery, in particular from the state. After February 24, and even before, we realized that the more stolen, the better. Because all this state can do is throw money at war. Therefore, the more of these funds were spent on the personal needs of the oligarchs, then for the better, otherwise they would not have built yachts and private planes for money, but warships and bombers. And the main thing is that a market economy was created.
One can, of course, argue that the oligarchs stole everything, but the question is what and from whom? They didn’t steal anything from anyone. And they didn’t betray anyone, and thank God that they betrayed the USSR. If they also betrayed Russia, that’s generally very good. Therefore, everything in this film is wrong.
The only traitor in this film was the state security of the USSR, about which not a word was said . FSB Maria Pevchikh (director – Channel 24) recalls three times when she names the position of Minister of State Security Mikhail Borsukov, that is (in the film – Channel 24) the FSB is simply an absent player in the history of Russia 1989 – 2000. In fact, this was the main player.
Korzhakov was shown in the film, but as a comrade of Yeltsin over a glass. And Alexander Korzhakov was the head of state security at that time, and even then he set the task of seizing power. He was unable to implement it in 1996, but already in 2000 they did it through Putin.
Until 1999, the FSB was already so in control of the situation that Yeltsin was put on the table with a “deck of three cards”: Yevgeny Primakov, the former director of the Russian Internal Intelligence Service, Sergei Stepashin, the former director of the FSK (then the FSB), and Vladimir Putin, the former director FSB. He could choose anyone from this deck, but power would still remain with the FSB. Unfortunately for us, he chose Putin. It's just harder to think of someone who would be worse than him.
Putin is not the main problem of Russia
I will quote Andrei Piontkovsky about Putin: “Enough about Putin. In the end, this is a rather random figure. If there were no Putin, Pupkin would have been found. What is important is Putinism, that is, the set of means that uses power for its reproduction. Putinism is the highest and the final stage of gangster capitalism in Russia.” Do you agree with this opinion?
I don’t quite agree with this . I really love and respect Andrei Andreevich Piontkovsky, we have an excellent relationship, but I have a slightly different view. I believe that state security as an agency is in power in Russia. These people installed Putin in 2000. The choice on their part turned out to be correct, because Putin has been providing the leadership of the country for the FSB for a quarter of a century. This is the first time in history that state security is at the helm.
Putin has held power for 25 years, except for those 4 years when he put his friend Medvedev in his place because he needed to rewrite the constitution during this time. This he did successfully. Therefore, Putin has been leading the state for 25 years, and as an agency this state is led by the FSB.
Of course, this is a gangster state. But, again, when the Bolsheviks came to power, it seemed to absolutely everyone that they would not be able to maintain this power for even six months. Because they were literally bandits, criminals. But this was not their main problem. The main problem turned out to be not that the bandits came and seized power in the Russian Empire, but that it was the Bolsheviks that seized power in the Russian Empire.
So it is now. Capitalism, against the backdrop of which the FSB came to power, may have been corrupt and gangster. We can agree that Putin is a thief and a corrupt official. But this is not the main reason why the whole world has problems with him. The important thing is that all these people came to power under the auspices of state security, and now the FSB runs this state. And the fact that among the FSB employees there are thieves, bandits, and corrupt officials is understandable. There is anyone there, as in any huge structure.
We don’t even fully understand how many hundreds of thousands of people work in it. But it is a very powerful structure. It is already more than a hundred years old, it survived the collapse of the Soviet Union, and its task, like any secret agency, is to remain in the shadows. So that we don’t see them, so that even now we don’t understand that the FSB is behind everything. That’s why we so easily rush to some bright events, cling to them and think that this is it, that it’s “not right” in Russia.
And there is only one thing “wrong” – state security in power. If it weren’t for this structure, maybe everything would be fine in Russia. But already in 1991, on the first day of the democratic revolution, everything was lost. That is, Russia had no chance to become a democracy. And there is evidence for this too. On the first day of the democratic revolution, on the famous tank from which Yeltsin spoke, Alexander Korzhakov and Viktor Zolotov, the future chief of Putin’s security, were already standing next to him. Behind Sobchak is already Putin as Sobchak’s assistant and so on.
That is, on this chessboard everyone was already arranged in such a way that the “democratic king” There was no chance of not getting checkmate. And Yeltsin was, frankly speaking, far from a “democratic king.” Therefore, this also, of course, played a role. But, perhaps, if he had not been distant, no one would have let him come close to power.
Therefore, we tend to underestimate the role of the FSB in Soviet and Russian history. It is not right. This is the main reason why all the troubles that happened to modern Russia happened.
What is a dictator afraid of
Is there things that Putin is afraid of now? Losing the war, ending up in The Hague? Possibly losing power through a coup?
These are all interconnected things. He can only end up in The Hague if he loses the war. A coup is unlikely to happen. Rather, a palace coup may occur, that is, the removal of Putin. Yes, theoretically this could happen, but you know, for some reason in history this never happens. And Hitler could not be eliminated, and Stalin, during his first 30 years of rule, could not be eliminated. Then, of course, he was eliminated, but at that time he had already been committing atrocities for 30 years.
Therefore, of course, than The longer Putin rules, the greater the chance that he will be eliminated like Stalin. Is he afraid of this? Yes, of course he is afraid. And that’s why he has a federal security service there, that’s why he creates the Russian Guard, tried to assemble a PMC.
On the one hand, the people around him are mostly military – they are subject to strict discipline and orders. On the other hand, the experience of modern Russia shows that it is impossible to seize power there through a coup. Vladimir Kryuchkov, the chairman of the KGB, tried to do this in August 1991, but he failed. Alexander Korzhakov tried to do this in 1996 through Yeltsin’s “soft resignation” and an attempt to cancel the elections – he failed. But in a relatively legal way through manipulation of the constitution, Yeltsin’s resignation and Putin’s appointment in 1991, it worked. I think the FSB has learned from this experience.
Putin is afraid that the regime will collapse/Screenshot from video
Conventionally, Patrushev cannot appear on TV screens and say that, by decision of the FSB board, Vladimir Putin was removed from office due to insane behavior, and now he (Patrushev – Channel 24) will lead the state. There are simply no such tools in Russia. In fact, there is not even a tool for removing the president from power. He can only die or, like Yeltsin, resign, and then, according to the constitution, he is replaced by the Prime Minister.
In theory, there seems to be would be the concept of “impeachment,” which we heard very often when the Duma wanted to remove Yeltsin through impeachment. But in reality the vote did not take place then, and we do not know what would have actually happened. That is, Yeltsin would have agreed with the decision of the Duma, or he would have said, who are you anyway and why should I agree with your decision?
So Putin cannot be removed through a coup. And, most likely, no one will do this. Because weapons are in the hands only of the FSB, the Russian Guard and the army. The army is led by Shoigu, and the army itself in Russia has always been lacking initiative. The Russian Guard is Zolotov, that is, also Putin’s man.
The FSB remains, but it has already made so many attempts in its life, starting in 1918, to seize power in the Soviet Union, and then in Russia, but was able to do this only in 2000. Therefore, I do not think that the FSB will risk overthrowing Putin for the sake of some other person. Because Putin ensures their dominance in the country as an agency.
I repeat, I don’t think that we should expect any forces to overthrow Putin. But there are no civilian forces in Russia. It is impossible to overthrow Putin without weapons. Therefore, the best chance to overthrow Putin is through the victory of Ukraine in this war, which could have been achieved easily and long ago if the West had the right strategy.
But their strategy now, unfortunately, is absolutely wrong. It lies in the fact that Russia should not lose in this war, and Ukraine should not win this war. Whereas the strategy should be exactly the opposite. Ukraine must win this war, and then Putin’s regime will collapse – Putin leaves and everything will fall into place.
All that remains is for the West to come to this idea and would, accordingly, help Ukraine by giving it aid packages. But not on the conditions that Ukraine will not use these weapons to attack Russian territory, but on the contrary – on the conditions that Ukraine is obliged to use these weapons to attack Russia, in particular Moscow. Then this war will be won, and then Putin’s regime will fall. And this is the only thing Putin is afraid of.
